Engineering problems in machine learning systems by Kuwajima, Hiroshi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
00
00
1v
2 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
2 A
ug
 20
19
Engineering problems in machine learning systems
Hiroshi Kuwajima
DENSO CORPORATION & Tokyo Institute of Technology
hiroshi.kuwajima.j7d@jp.denso.com, kuwajima@ok.sc.e.titech.ac.jp
Hirotoshi Yasuoka
DENSO CORPORATION
hirotoshi.yasuoka.j2z@jp.denso.com
Toshihiro Nakae
DENSO CORPORATION
toshihiro.nakae.j8z@jp.denso.com
Abstract
Fatal accidents are a major issue hindering the wide acceptance of safety-critical
systems that employ machine learning and deep learning models, such as auto-
mated driving vehicles. In order to use machine learning in a safety-critical sys-
tem, it is necessary to demonstrate the safety and security of the system through
engineering processes. However, thus far, no such widely accepted engineering
concepts or frameworks have been established for these systems. The key to using
a machine learning model in a deductively engineered system is decomposing the
data-driven training of machine learningmodels into requirement, design, and ver-
ification, particularly for machine learning models used in safety-critical systems.
Simultaneously, open problems and relevant technical fields are not organized in a
manner that enables researchers to select a theme and work on it. In this study, we
identify, classify, and explore the open problems in engineering (safety-critical)
machine learning systems — that is, in terms of requirement, design, and verifica-
tion of machine learning models and systems — as well as discuss related works
and research directions, using automated driving vehicles as an example. Our
results show that machine learning models are characterized by a lack of require-
ments specification, lack of design specification, lack of interpretability, and lack
of robustness. We also perform a gap analysis on a conventional system quality
standard SQuARE with the characteristics of machine learning models to study
quality models for machine learning systems. We find that a lack of requirements
specification and lack of robustness have the greatest impact on conventional qual-
ity models.
1 Introduction
Recent developments in machine learning techniques, such as deep neural networks (NNs), have
led to the widespread application of systems that assign advanced environmental perception and
decision-making to computer logics learned from big data instead of manually built rule-based log-
ics [10]. Highly complex machine learning techniques such as NNs have been studied for decades,
however until recently, we have suffered from numerous training data to train complex models prop-
erly and computingmethods to performhigh computational complexity of training suchmodels. The
availability of big data and affordable high-performance computing, such as deep learning frame-
works on off-the-shelf graphics processing units (GPUs) [38], have made highly complex machine
learning techniques practical for various applications including automatic speech recognition [28],
image recognition [44], natural language processing [63], drag discovery [67], and recommendation
systems [24].
Preprint. Work in progress.
Machine learning models are becoming indispensable components even of systems that re-
quire safety-critical environmental perception and decision-making such as automated-driving sys-
tems [48]. A safety-critical systems is a system whose failure may result in safety issues such as
death or serious injury to people. For safety-critical systems, worst-case performance is more im-
portant than average performance, and developers are held strictly accountable. However, for human
society to accept such safety-critical machine learning systems, it is important to develop common
engineering frameworks, such as quality measures and standard engineering processes, to manage
the risks of using machine learning models and systems that include machine learning models [43].
Such frameworks, and ultimately the quality assurance based on them, have an impact on social
receptivity because they can be one of the approaches used to deliver safety and security. In fact,
recent accidents caused during the use of several experimental automated vehicles have revealed the
imperative need to address the upcoming social issue of (quality) assurance based on such frame-
works [1]. Engineering frameworks such as standard development processes have been studied for
conventional systems and software for years, and machine learning systems also need such frame-
works that engineers can follow. In order to establish engineering frameworks, it is necessary to
visualize and organize these open problems; thus, experts from numerous different technical fields
discuss these problems in depth and develop solutions driven by engineering needs.
In this study, we review the open engineering problems associated with safety-critical machine learn-
ing systems and also present related works and future directions for research. We hypothesize an
ideal training process that connects deductive requirements and data-driven training by considering
test data as a requirements specification and training data as a design specification; thereafter, we
review open problems for the process. Our results show that machine learning models are character-
ized by a lack of requirements specification, lack of design specification, lack of interpretability, and
lack of robustness. In addition, we discover that requirements specification and verification for open
environments are key aspects of machine learning systems. We also study quality models for ma-
chine learning systems, which can be used for future requirements and evaluations of these machine
learning systems. Our results show that a lack of requirements specification and lack of robustness
have the greatest impact on conventional system quality models.
2 Background
An automated driving vehicle is a vehicle that operates without human input. Automated driving
has not been built as a stand-alone system in a vehicle but can be realized using a system comprising
clouds, roadside devices (fog or cloud edge), and automated driving vehicles (edge) [11], which
create and update high-precision digital maps [54] while cooperating with peripheral vehicles. An
in-vehicle automated driving system installed in a vehicle comprises multiple subsystems for per-
ception, planning, and control; such a system realizes automated driving operations in cooperation
with clouds and roadside units [2]. For simplicity, in this paper, we focus on these in-vehicle au-
tomated driving systems. Each perception, planning, and control subsystem may contain necessary
machine learning models. Supervised learning models [44] and reinforcement learning models [49]
can be used for perception and planning, while non-machine learning control algorithms can be
used for control. In order to build a machine learning system, it is necessary to define its engi-
neering processes and quality measures in advance, then follow and measure them strictly during
development time. Conventional systems were developed in a rigorous development process involv-
ing requirement, design, and verification, cf. V-Model [32] (a graphical representation of a systems
development lifecycle).
In this study, we identify open engineering problems at two levels — systems and machine learning
models — and use an automated driving system as an example of a safety-critical machine learning
system. We proceed to investigate the problems in terms of the three steps of the development
process: requirement, design, and verification. The two levels and three steps are illustrated in
Fig. 1. Notably, many of the problems considered in this paper do not occur only in automated
driving systems but also generally in safety-critical systems.
This study is related to preceding studies [25, 58] that studied the applicability of ISO 26262 [34]
and Automotive SPICE [68] to automotive software using machine learning and deep learning. Our
work assumes a more general development process to show open problems; we examined quality
models for machine learning systems, based on a conventional system and software quality standard,
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Figure 1: Engineering process of machine learning systems
Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuARE) [35], which has not been
done in previous studies.
3 Engineering machine learning models
A machine learning model is acquired by executing a training algorithm with a model structure and
training data sets for inputs, while trained models are evaluated using test datasets [51]. This is
a data-driven inductive method that differs from the deductive development used for conventional
systems. In this paper, we call a machine learning model that has undefined parameters a ”model
structure.” In order to use machine learning models in a deductively engineered system, it is nec-
essary to break down the data-driven training of model parameters into requirements, designs, and
verifications, particularly for models used in safety-critical systems.
We hypothesize the engineering process for machine learning models in Fig. 2. The dotted boxes
in the figure illustrate the differences between the conventional training process and hypothesized
training process. A requirement of machine learning models can be the specification of test data,
although the current practice is to divide the original data into training and test data sets [5, 62]. The
design process then specifies or builds the training data to achieve high performance in the test data,
with the model requirements as a background. The explicit specification of test data and training data
addresses a lack of requirements specification and a lack of design specification, respectively. In the
current practice, the verification of machine learning models is measured using performancemetrics
on the test data. However, we consider it important to check properties that cannot be measured
using the test data, such as robustness and interpretability.
In the following subsections, we introduce our ideas related to the requirements, designs, and veri-
fications of machine learning models, as well as research directions and related works.
3.1 Requirements of machine learning models
Most current machine learning research undoubtedly assumes that test data is given [30, 44]; it is
the main part of a model’s requirements. Test data must be carefully specified at the beginning of
development, by either the developers or contractees of the machine learning model, and must be
agreed upon by their contractors. Thus, the main open engineering problem here is the deductive
definition of the requirements for machine learning models and their test data to enable the test data
to connect with deductive requirements and data-driven training. In machine learning, the roles of
training data and test data must be considered to be different. While training data is used to improve
the performance of a machine learningmodel [37], we propose considering the test data to accurately
reflect the environmental conditions in operation. However, in practice [7], when all data obtained
at the time of development are divided, some are used as training data and the others become test
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Figure 2: Engineering process of machine learning models
data [5, 62]. For simplicity, we ignore validation data for model selection. Despite the ultimate goal
of machine learning models to work well in operation, we test machine learning models on test data,
which originates from the same source as training data. In this manner, the training and test data are
approximately equally distributed, but their relationship to the operational data (which is the actual
target of the model) is unknown or it is implicitly assumed that the training, test, and operational
data sets are similar [8]. In other words, machine learning models are trained using data-driven
methods that lack requirements specification.
In particular, in a safety-critical machine learning system, it is necessary to specify the distribution
of test data (considering the operational environment the system will actually be operated in) and to
collect the test data based on these specifications. By accepting an a priori viewpoint of the distri-
bution of test data, we can define the assumed environment deductively and collect data inductively.
Moreover, by assuming the distribution of test data, we can discuss the operational domain (opera-
tional data distribution) for requirements specification. Operational data tend to change with time,
thereby deteriorating model performance in operation [66, 69]. The deviation between test data
used during development and operational data can become larger with time from what it was when
development was completed. This phenomenon is referred to either as covariance shift [8], distri-
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butional shift [3], or concept drift [66]. If the operational data trend changes from that of test data,
then machine learning models trained on the test data do not work on the changed operational data.
Thus, it is important to check for consistency between operational data and test data (assuming the
original environment) and to either make the machine learning models follow the operational data
in a continuous maintenance process or to, at least, detect the deviation between test and operational
data. A lack of requirements specification is a barrier to this.
Related works and research directions for requirements of machine learning models
Although it does not incorporate the specification of test data, i.e., requirements specification, run-
time monitoring of neuron activation patterns is an approach to detect change points [14]. It creates
a monitor of neuron activation patterns after training time, and runs the monitor at operation time to
measure the deviation from training time. Change is detected when the activation pattern at opera-
tion time becomes detached from the neuron activation pattern at training time. Neuron activation
patterns on test data may implicitly include the model requirements as a background.
Even in the current development of in-vehicle automated driving systems, the test data would be
collected assuming the operational environment, in order to make the distribution of the operational
data and that of the test data as consistent as possible. However, the methods used to describe the
assumed environment of machine learning models are not organized. In particular, specific methods
are required to define the completeness of test data. In previous literature, CV-HAZOP (Computer
Vision - Hazard and Operability Studies) [73] defined a catalogue of challenges (risks) for computer
vision algorithms. The catalogue has 1, 469 manually registered risks as of now. Including all CV-
HAZOP risks can be a test data coverage in computer vision problems. When systematically testing
machine learningmodels to achieve test data coverage, we experience combinatorial explosion while
guiding the data sampling process. In previous literature, quantitative projection coverage was used
to resolve such combinatorial explosion [12].
Although these previous works focused on combinatory environments, the importance or critical-
ity of each environment could change. For example, criticality of misclassification of pedestrians
may be high in daytime city street, whereas that of vehicles may be high in night time highway.
CV-HAZOP proposes that the catalogue of challenges creates a basis for referencing criticalities
for each risk and calculating criticality coverage [73]. Figure 3 illustrates our proposed example
of requirements specification. Test data must have attributes, such as time and weather, and their
distributions that are based on the assumed environment (Fig. 3(a)). Recent public driving data sets
have such attributes. For example, BDD100K [71] has weather conditions, including sunny, over-
cast, and rainy, different times of day, including daytime and nighttime, as well as scenes, including
city street, gas stations, highway, parking lot, residential, and tunnel. Further, since the required
performance may change for each environment, it is necessary to express the association between
the assumed environment and the required performance. Each condition of the test data distribution
can have a different confusion matrix (or other performance metrics) that machine learning models
will have as desired values (Fig. 3(c)).
3.2 Design of machine learning models
A machine learning model is automatically obtained by training the parameters of a model structure
using training data. Thus, specifications cannot be designed a priori — that is, machine learn-
ing models lack design specifications). This limitation is essential and unavoidable because high-
performancemachine learning models are developed by learning high-dimensional parameters from
data that engineers cannot manually specify. However, in the development of a safety-critical ma-
chine learning system, it is necessary to record the model structure, training data, and training sys-
tem, including training specifications— such as hyper parameters, initial parameters, learning rates,
and random number seeds — to secure the reproducibility of the training process.
Engineers cannot design the training; however, they can design the training data. Training data,
as a large indirect part of the design specification, coupled with training specifications is carefully
designed to achieve the requirements specification. In this manner, the lack of design specification
is indirectly remedied. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there is no standard or widely accepted
process of designing training data for machine learning models.
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† E.g., there are many pedestrians in fine daytime, and they are prioritized.
‡ E.g., there are many vehicles in rainy nights, and they are prioritized.
Figure 3: Example environment requirements specification (data distribution matrix) and perfor-
mance requirements specification (confusion matrix)
Related works and research directions for design of machine learning models
One of the challenges with the lack of design specification is the establishment of a training process
for machine learning models by designing training data and models. Training data must be designed
in the process by iteratively identifying the weak points of the model and then generating or col-
lecting additional data for training. A previous suggestion [53] indicates that a criteria for growing
training data is that the training error is low while the test error is high; however, the suggestion does
not show what types of data must be added. It is known that deep learning models, in particular,
easily fit a random labeling of the training data [74] and, thus, the distribution of training data is
important.
3.3 Verification of machine learning models
Machine learning models are mainly verified by running a model on test data; however, certain
properties of a machine learning model, such as robustness, cannot be evaluated with test data.
Therefore, we introduce property checking in the verification of machine learning models.
An increasing stability against disturbance, or a lack of robustness, is key to the verification of
machine learning models. It has been reported that image recognition models incorrectly recognize
slight noise that cannot be recognized by humans with high confidence, thereby creating what are
called adversarial examples (AEs) [64]. An AE is known to have model-independent versatility and
is an issue that can threaten the safety of automated driving systems, depending on image recogni-
tion. For example, when evaluating robustness against an AE as fault tolerance, it is necessary to
artificially generate perturbations around data points. We can generate an AE close to a data point
specified in the requirements and quantify the robustness using the maximum radius in which the
model can yield correct answers.
The inference processes of advanced machine learning models — such as NNs — are considered
black boxes, and machine learning models lack interpretability. In this context, a black box refers
to a situation where, although feature activations can be observed physically, the actual phenomenon
cannot be understood. That being said, safety-critical systems must exhibit interpretability and trans-
parency. The interpretability of machine learning models has been well-researched recently and
there are several methods for addressing it. LIME [57] is one of the most well-known methods for
improving interpretability. It derives a simple interpretable model to explain the behavior of an orig-
inal model around a given data point. NN visualization [29] also shows great promise to improve
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interpretability. Object detectors emerging in deep scene CNNs is an NN visualization that inten-
tionally performs occlusion on input data and specifies the region where the inference result changes
drastically as a region of interest [75, 76]; another method back-propagates activation values from
the influencer nodes during the subsequent feature extraction process to identify the region of in-
terest [72] and generate heat maps [9, 50, 60, 61] for convolutional NNs. Further, interpretability
is also useful for performance improvement, debugging during training, and validating of training
results. Developers can understand the internal behavior of a trained NN to train higher performance
models [45]. For example, a developer can visualize an NN’s focus points for an incorrect inference
and understand what was wrong, before additional training data is collected according to the anal-
ysis. If a machine learning model outputs an incorrect inference, but the visualized focus area is
natural for humans, then an inaccurate ground truth label is suggested.
Related works and research directions for verification of machine learning models
In the field of theoretical computer science, the automatic design verification [46] based on formal
verification technologies for certain properties, such as safety and liveness [26], makes the verifi-
cation of a machine learning model possible. Several automatic verification techniques exist for
NNs and we categorize them here. The initial categories are function and decision problems. The
former quantifies the degrees of properties, while the latter identifies if the properties are satisfied in
a machine learning model. Related works for function problems address adversarial frequency and
severity [6] as well as maximumperturbation bound [15], referring to the frequency of AE found, the
expectation of the closest AE, and the maximum absolute value of the perturbation of inputs that do
not change the outputs, respectively. Decision problems are further subdivided into verification and
falsification, which seek a complete proof and counterexamples by best effort, respectively. Related
works of verification are global safety [56], local safety [55], (ǫ, δ)-robustness [40], and (x, η, δ)-
safe [31]. Global safety is output bound, and local safety is the consistency of inference among
close data points. A related example for falsification is the CNN Analyzer [22, 23]. It identifies
counterexamples against the signal temporal logic [21] properties of in-vehicle automated driving
systems and counterexamples of object (vehicle) detection by convolutional NNs. Further, Relu-
plex [41] is a solver used to both verify and falsify first-order propositional logics [4] against NNs
using Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) [52] for activation functions. Reluplex is an SMT (satisfiability
modulo theories) solver [19] to verify properties of deep NNs or provide counterexamples against
them by utilizing the simplex method [18] and the partial linearity of the ReLU function. Depend-
ability metrics set for NNs is a related work that proposes metrics such as scenario coverage, neuron
activation pattern, interpretation precision for RICC (robustness, interpretability, completeness, and
correctness) criteria [13].
4 Engineering machine learning systems
In this section, we review open engineering problems in terms of the system level of in-vehicle auto-
mated driving systems as an example of safety-critical machine learning systems. Problems related
to machine learning systems originate from machine learning models and the open environments in
which automated vehicles function. The former is low modularity of machine learning systems due
to the characteristics of machine learning models, such as lack of design specifications and lack of
robustness. The latter include capturing physical operational environments and user behaviors of
in-vehicle automated driving systems for requirements and addressing the intractableness of field
operation testing (FOT) for verification. An open environment problem is not directly related to
machine learning, although it is an important challenge for in-vehicle automated driving systems. In
this paper, we consider open environments to be a common challenge for machine learning systems
because machine learning models are employed to capture these complex environments.
4.1 Requirements of machine learning systems
In order to develop high quality systems and products, comprehensive requirements specifications
and the evaluation of machine learning systems based on the requirements specification are needed;
in turn, these require appropriate quality characteristics for the systems that can be used for require-
ments and evaluations. Quality characteristics of machine learning ”systems” are more important in
the context of industry than those of machine learning ”models,” because machine learning models
are not used in a stand-alone manner but are always embedded in systems. System and software
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quality models have been developed for years; however, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no standard quality model that adapts the characteristics of machine learning models — such as
lack of requirements specifications, design specifications, interpretability, and robustness — into
account. Thus, we conduct a gap analysis on a conventional system and software quality standard,
SQuARE [35] in 5.
Another important aspect of machine learning (or any other) systems is that they cannot operate in
every environment and require limitations or warranty scopes. Thus, a particular machine learning
system must be implemented for a predefined environment. Environment attributes to be prede-
fined for automated driving systems are static conditions such as weather, times of day, scene, road,
as well as dynamic conditions (dynamics of) such as the vehicle under control and other moving
objects (surrounding vehicles and pedestrians). However, there are various (uncountable) types of
roads, traffic lights, and traffic participants, such as other vehicles (be they automated or manually
driven) and pedestrians; therefore, it is not easy to define the operational environment for in-vehicle
automated driving systems. An open engineering problem in the requirements specification of ma-
chine learning systems is that there is no standard means to design and define such environments,
i.e., requirements specification cannot be clearly defined. In the automotive industry, this is called
the operational design domain [27, 65] and it can be defined by conditions such as geographical
areas, road types, traffic conditions, and maximum speed of the subject vehicle [16].
Related works and research directions for requirements of machine learning systems
The German PEGASUS project is a joint initiative of vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, tool ven-
dors, certification organizations, and research institutes, aiming to define standard quality assurance
methods for automated-driving systems [47]. The purpose of this project is to clarify the expected
performance level and evaluation criteria of automated driving systems through scenario-based ver-
ification. The scope of the project includes standard test procedures, continuous and flexible tool
chains, the integration of tests into development processes, cross-company test methods, require-
ment definition methods, driving scenarios, and a common database of scenarios. Scenarios are
collected from test drives and the market to demonstrate that systems are equal to, or better than,
human drivers. Scenario collection, i.e., building requirements specification, and scenario-based
verification are conducted in a continuousmanner. Regular scenarios are continuously tested by sim-
ulation, and critical scenarios are tested through artificially configured environments on test courses.
The PEGASUS project is an excellent example of the continuous requirements and verification for
in-vehicle automated driving systems and their verification.
4.2 Design of machine learning systems
An open engineering problem at the system level of machine learning systems is designing systems
that include machine learning models by considering and applying the characteristics of ”Change
Anything Change Everything” (CACE) [59]. CACE originates from a lack of design specification
in machine learning models. Machine learning models are trained in a data-driven manner, thereby
making the localizing of change difficult. If a small part is changed, then the entire machine learning
changes once it is trained again. Subsequently, machine learning systems have to be changed for the
newly trained machine learning models. In order to prevent reworking after training machine learn-
ing models, it is necessary to have system architectures that can cope with additional requirements
without modification of the model.
In general, it is difficult for a machine learning model to achieve 100% accuracy on test data [20]
and as its accuracy approaches 100%, further performance improvement becomes difficult. There-
fore, optimizing machine learning models is not the only means to improve subsystem performance,
thereby making a rigorous breakdown of subsystem requirements into machine learning model re-
quirements essential for safety-critical machine learning systems. In this process, safety analysis
methods and processes are important, such as the encapsulation of machine learning models by
rule-based safeguarding and the use of redundant and diverse architecture that absorbs and mitigates
the uncertainty of machine learning models.
Related works and research directions for design of machine learning systems
To the best of our knowledge, we do not find special techniques that directly address the design of
machine learning systems. SOTIF [70], a safety standard/process concerning performance limits
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of functionalities, focuses on securing functionalities with uncertainty. Uncertain functionalities
include machine learning models. SOTIF has a process that includes identification of scenarios that
can trigger unsafe actions (triggering conditions) for the system and system modifications to address
them [17]. The process standards can be potentially effective in the design of machine learning
system in general, rather than evaluating an entire machine learning system upon completion of
development. In addition to process standards, research directions include test stubs for machine
learning models, encapsulation of machine learning models by rule-based safeguarding, and the
use of redundant and diverse architecture that mitigates and absorbs the low robustness of machine
learning models.
4.3 Verification of machine learning systems
The simplest approach to verifying an in-vehicle automated driving system is by verification against
actual data. Accumulating a large number of safe automated driving trips, with long distances to
match human drivers, will effectively demonstrate that in-vehicle automated driving systems are as
safe as human drivers. In order to verify the system within a realistic time-frame, there are two
options: reduce the required verification scenarios or accelerate the verification. Therefore, high
accuracy verification models must be able to exclude unreal scenarios. It is necessary to accelerate
simulation experimentation, thereby reproducing corner-case scenarios on test courses with a short
mileage (i.e., scenarios with an extremely low probability of occurrence and ones that are difficult
to statistically obtain through FOT on an actual road).
Related works and research directions for verification of machine learning systems
Obtaining statistically significant results would require FOT on a humongous number of miles [39].
[39] is based on a simple hypothesis testing, and the resulting required miles may not reflect actual
situations. Research directions include building detailed close-to-reality models for driving scenes
and scenarios to reflect the real world conditions and reduce FOT miles.
5 Quality of machine learning systems
We reviewed the open engineering problems in machine learning systems, and recognized that ma-
chine learning models are characterized by their lack of requirements specifications, design spec-
ifications, interpretability, and robustness. In this section, we study quality models for machine
learning systems by discussing the combination of these machine learning characteristics and a con-
ventional system and software quality standard, SQuARE[35].
5.1 Quality models for conventional systems
We focus on SQuARE, ISO/IEC 25000 series [35], as the conventional system quality baseline.
Systems and software quality are usually studied in software engineering. One of the earliest work
is an international standard ISO/IEC 9126 Software engineering— Product quality [36], first issued
in 1991. ISO/IEC 9126 classified software quality into six characteristics: Functionality, Reliability,
Usability, Efficiency, Maintainability, and Portability. ISO/IEC 9126 was replaced by its succeeding
international standard ISO/IEC 25000 series, Systems and software engineering — Systems and
software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) [35]. SQuARE is a widely acknowledged
system quality standard and includes quality measures (QMs) and quality measure elements (QMEs)
as well as quality models, characteristics, and sub-characteristics. These components have a tree
structure (one-to-many relationships), and the top-level quality models are Product quality, Data
quality, Quality in use, and IT service quality, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Boxes with thick lines and
thin lines in Fig. 4 represent quality models and quality characteristics, respectively. Quality sub-
characteristics are not defined for Data quality.
Each quality characteristic of Data quality, or each quality sub-characteristic of Product quality and
Quality in use, has multiple QMs that define how to quantify the quality. A QM X is defined in the
form of a formula, such that X = A/B and X = 1− A/B, and the elements in the formula A and
B are QMEs. An example set of a quality model, a characteristic, a sub-characteristic, a QM, and
QMEs are Product quality, Reliability, Maturity, Mean time between failure, and Operation time
(QME 1) and Number of system/software failures that actually occurred (QME 2), respectively.
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Figure 4: Quality models and quality characteristics in SQuARE
There are other QMs for the sub-characteristic Maturity (such as Failure rate, whose QMEs are
Number of failures detected during observation time and Duration of observation). QMs and QMEs
are not defined for IT service quality.
5.2 Gap analysis
We performed a gap analysis between conventional system quality models and future system quality
models for machine learning systems, given a conventional system and software quality standard
SQuARE and the characteristics of the machine learning models introduced in this paper. In order
to conduct the most fine and precise analysis, we checked each QME (such as the number of sys-
tems/software failures that actually occurred) against each machine learning characteristic (such as
a lack of robustness) to see if the QME was affected by the machine learning characteristic. If a
QME in machine learning systems became immeasurable, as is the case with conventional systems,
then the parent quality (sub-)characteristic would have gaps. IT service quality model was ignored
in this gap analysis because it has no QME defined in the ISO/IEC 25000 series. Table 1 presents
an example of impact analysis of characteristics of machine learning models and QMEs defined
for Functional suitability in Product quality. Req, Des, Rob, and Tra are abbreviations for lack of
requirements specification, design specification, robustness, and transparency, respectively. Func-
tional suitability in Product quality was selected only to serve as an example, and corresponding
analysis was conducted for all QMEs of all quality models, except for IT service quality model.
We examined 1, 464 combinations of 366 QMEs and 4 characteristics of machine learning models
to obtain the results. The number of combinations we identified as being affected by machine learn-
ing models was 20 from among 1, 464. Tables 2, 3, and 4 are the summaries of impact analysis on
Product quality, Data quality, and Quality in use models affected by the characteristics of machine
learning models. QM and QME levels are omitted. Each QME associated with a quality (sub-
)characteristic was examined to determine if it was affected by any machine learning characteristics:
a lack of requirements specification (Req), a lack of design specification (Des), a lack of robustness
(Rob), or and lack of transparency (Tra). The section signs with numbers in parentheses next to
machine learning characteristics are the indices to the itemization in the subsequent paragraphs. The
number of QMEs affected by the machine learning characteristics are presented in the abovemen-
tioned tables. If we consider that the ratios of QMEs affected by characteristics of machine learning
models are an indication of the impacts to quality (sub-)characteristics, then at the quality-model
level, it is evident that the impact to Product quality is the highest, while those of Data quality and
Quality in use are low.
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Table 1: Example impact analysis (Functional suitability characteristic in Product quality model)
QM QME Req Des Rob Tra
Functional coverage
Number of functions missing
Number of functions specified
Functional correctness
Number of functions that are incorrect †
Number of functions considered ‡
Functional
appropriateness of usage
objective
Number of functions missing or incorrect
among those that are required for achieving
a specific usage objective.
††
Number of functions required for achiev-
ing a specific usage objective
‡‡
Functional
appropriateness of system
Appropriateness score for a usage objec-
tive
Number of usage objectives
†When the input changes slightly, the result can changes drastically. We cannot measure the
correctness of the function precisely. Perturbed trials can quantify the uncertainty.
‡ Functions considered cannot be defined strictly. For example, there are many pedestrian
variations of pedestrian detection for an auto emergency braking (AEB) function, and it can be
multiple functions. We cannot define functions without ambiguity.
††When the input changes slightly, the result can changes drastically. We cannot measure the
correctness of the function precisely. Perturbed trials can quantify the uncertainty.
‡‡ Functions considered cannot be defined strictly. For example, there are many pedestrian
variations for pedestrian detection, and it can be multiple functions. We cannot define functions
without ambiguity.
The characteristics of machine learning models that affected QMEs the most were a lack of require-
ments specification and a lack of robustness. First, we discuss the impact of a lack of requirements
specification. Quality characteristics involving preconditions (such as operational contexts, the in-
terval of values, and operational environments) were affected by a lack of requirements specifica-
tion. This is because requirements specifications define preconditions for systems. As discussed
previously, machine learning models are trained using data-driven processes and lack explicit re-
quirements specifications. Instead, preconditions are implicitly encoded in training data and not
explicitly described. Thus, the following QMEs become unmeasurable due to a lack of precondi-
tions (requirements specifications).
§1 Number of functions which were tested in different operational environments
[Product quality / Portability / Adaptability / Operational environment adaptability]
§2 Number of data items for which can be defined a required interval of values
[Data quality / Accuracy / Data accuracy range]
§3 Total number of required distinct contexts of use
[Quality in use / Context coverage / Context completeness / Context completeness]
§4 Total number of additional contexts in which the product might be used
[Quality in use / Context coverage / Flexibility / Flexible context of use]
Note that the corresponding quality model, characteristic, sub-characteristic, and QM are described
in square brackets. Different operational environments in which systems must be tested, required
intervals of values for data items, distinct contexts of use, and additional contexts in which the
product might be used cannot be defined for data-driven training processes; the above QMEs are not
measurable.
The reasons for a lack of requirements specifications in machine learning models are twofold: a lack
of preconditions (introduced in the last paragraph) and a difficulty defining the desired behaviors of
machine learning models due to the wide variety of input and output patterns. For example, there are
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Table 2: Impact analysis on Product quality model
Number of QMEs
Characteristic Sub-characteristic all affected
Functional suitability Functional correctness 2 2 Req (§5), Rob (§9)
Functional appropriateness 4 2 Req (§6), Rob (§10)
Others 2 0
Subtotals 8 4
Performance Efficiency Any 29 0
Subtotals 29 0
Compatibility Any 8 0
Subtotals 8 0
Usability Operability 18 1 Tra (§19)
Others 25 0
Subtotals 43 1
Reliability Maturity 8 2 Rob×2 (§12, §13)
Fault tolerance 7 2 Rob (§11), Des (§16)
Others 8 0
Subtotals 23 4
Security Any 22 0
Subtotals 22 0
Maintainability Modularity 4 2 Tra (§17)
Analysability 6 1 Tra (§20)
Modifiability 7 1 Des (§18)
Testability 6 1 Rob (§14)
Others 4 0
Subtotals 27 5
Portability Adaptability 6 1 Req (§1)
Replaceability 8 2 Req (§7)
Others 5 0
Subtotals 19 3
Total 179 15
numerous variations of pedestrians (such as young and old, one with bags and umbrella) for an AEB
function and it is difficult to define the function precisely (the types of pedestrians that the system
covers) without ambiguity. Being unable to define precise functions affects Function suitability, as
well as Portability of Product quality. Being unable to define precise normal conditions, outliers for a
wide variety of input data values are not definable, neither. The following QMEs are not measurable
due to the difficulty of defining behaviors:
§5 Number of functions that are incorrect
[Product quality / Functional suitability / Functional correctness / Functional correctness]
§6 Number of functions missing or incorrect among those that are required for achieving a specific
usage objective
[Product quality / Functional suitability / Functional appropriateness / Functional appropriateness of
usage objective]
§7 Number of functions which produce similar results as before
[Product quality / Portability / Replaceability / Functional inclusiveness]
§8 Number of data values that are outliers
[Data quality model / Accuracy / Risk of data set inaccuracy]
Next, we discuss the impact of a lack of robustness. QMEs that observemachine learning system be-
havior are affected by a lack of robustness. When the inputs of machine learning models change even
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Table 3: Impact analysis on Data quality model
Number of QMEs
Characteristic all affected
Accuracy 14 2 Req ×2 (§2, §8), Rob (§15)
Completeness 16 0
Consistency 12 0
Credibility 8 0
Currentness 6 0
Accessibility 6 0
Compliance 4 0
Confidentiality 4 0
Efficiency 14 0
Precision 4 0
Traceability 6 0
Understandability 14 0
Availability 6 0
Portability 6 0
Recoverability 6 0
Total 126 3
Table 4: Impact analysis on Quality in use model
Number of QMEs
Characteristic Sub-characteristic all affected
Effectiveness Any 8 0
Subtotals 8 0
Efficiency Any 11 0
Subtotals 11 0
Satisfaction Any 13 0
Subtotals 13 0
Freedom from risk Any 21 0
Subtotals 21 0
Context coverage Context completeness 2 1 Req (§3)
Flexibility 6 1 Req (§4)
Subtotals 8 2
Total 61 2
slightly, the results can change drastically. Therefore, the behavior of such systems becomes uncer-
tain and we cannot measure (count) correct behavior. Moreover, we noticed that the QMEs affected
by low robustness were similar to those affected by a lack of requirements specification. The QMs
using these QMEs are typically ratios, with numerators being QMEs that count correct behavior
and denominators being QMEs that count preconditions. For example, one of the quality measures
of Functional correctness is X = 1 − A/B, where A = [Number of functions that are incorrect],
B = [Number of functions considered]. We cannot measure the numerator A and the denominator
B due to the two characteristics of machine learning models — a lack of robustness and a lack of
requirements specification, respectively. The following QMEs are not precisely measurable due to a
lack of robustness:
§9 Number of functions that are incorrect
[Product quality / Functional suitability / Functional correctness / Functional correctness]
§10 Number of functions missing or incorrect among those that are required for achieving a specific
usage objective
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[Product quality / Functional suitability / Functional appropriateness / Functional appropriateness of
usage objective]
§11 Number of avoided critical and serious failure occurrences based on test cases
[Product quality / Reliability / Fault tolerance / Failure avoidance]
QMEs related to negative events affected the difficulty of capturing rare cases of machine learning
models, which is another form of a lack of robustness. Outliers and failures in SQuARE should
have included rare cases; however, rare cases may not appear in a limited time frame and when they
do, the extremely low probability of occurrence may be neglected. As mentioned previously, an
extremely long FOT is required to capture such rare events. The following are the QMEs that were
underestimated due to the difficulty of overlooking rare cases:
§12 Number of system/software failures actually occurred
[Product quality / Reliability / Maturity / Mean time between failure, MTBF]
§13 Number of failures detected during observation time
[Product quality / Reliability / Maturity / Failure rate]
§14 Number of test functions required
[Product quality / Maintainability / Testability / Test function completeness]
§15 Number of data values that are outliers
[Data quality / Accuracy / Risk of data set inaccuracy]
There is a small impact on machine learning systems due to the lack of design specification and lack
of transparency characteristics. If there are no design specifications, we cannot estimate the effort
of a system modification nor the impact of a local modification to the overall system. We cannot
forecast how many hours the training process will require, in advance. In addition, we cannot know
the strengths and weaknesses of automatically trained machine learning models in general. There-
fore, we cannot know the redundancy of components without design specification or transparency.
Models with similar weaknesses do not work as redundancies, and redundant installation does not
make sense for machine learning models. The following are QMEs that are unmeasurable due to a
lack of design specifications and a lack of transparency:
§16 Number of system components redundantly installed
[Product quality / Reliability / Fault tolerance / Redundancy of components]
§17 Number of components which are implemented with no impact on others
[Product quality / Maintainability / Modularity / Coupling of components]
§18 Expected time for making a specific type of modification
[Product quality / Maintainability / Modifiability / Modification efficiency]
Since there is no established method of diagnostic and monitoring functionalities for machine learn-
ing models, the following QMEs are not measurable for machine learning systems.
§19 Number of functions having state monitoring capability
[Product quality / Usability / Operability / Monitoring capability]
§20 Number of diagnostic functions useful for causal analysis
[Product quality / Maintainability / Analysability / Diagnosis function effectiveness]
We have discussed the combination of machine learning characteristics with a conventional system
and software quality standard, SQuARE. The typical gaps for the quality models of machine learning
systems were found in requirements specification (precondition specification and level of detail for
function specification) and robustness (uncertainty of observation and extremely low probable rare
cases). In order to address these gaps, system quality models can be modified and/or extended. We
introduce the direction to address these gaps in 5.3.
5.3 Toward quality models for machine learning systems
The first set of challenges exist in quality measures for preconditions and functions (functionalities)
for machine learning systems, that is, requirements specification. We assume that preconditions and
function specifications are defined by input range and pairs of input/output, respectively. If input
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and/or output data are high-dimensional, both defining preconditions and detailed function specifi-
cations are difficult. As machine learning models are trained in a data-driven manner, we inevitably
conclude that data is involved. One natural idea is first to manually engineer the deductive specifica-
tions in as detailed a manner as possible and second to prepare data that includes example instances
for requirements specifications. Requirements specifications of machine learning systems cannot
fully define the preconditions and functions; however, the remaining uncertainty of specifications is
covered by examples. In order to make requirements specifications as detailed as possible, we need
quality definitions (and subsequently QM) of requirements specifications themselves. A type of QM
for requirements specifications is the sum of the quality of deductive requirements specification and
the quality of inductive requirements specification, that is, sample data.
The quality of deductive requirements specifications for machine learning systems — that is, the
level of details of requirements specifications — is not straightforward to measure. Although not
quantitative, a proxy of quality of deductive requirements specification is to measure the level of de-
tail of the background argument. An earlier study [33] used structured arguments, like goal structure
notation (GSN) [42], to address uncertain requirements and environments. Quality measures of de-
ductive requirements specification such as the following can be added to quality models of machine
learning systems:
• ”Number of functions with preconditions specified with structured argument” divided by
”Number of functions that could benefit from specifying preconditions”
• ”Number of functions with detailed function specification with structured argument” di-
vided by ”Number of functions that could benefit from detailed function specification”
Further, the quality of inductive requirements specification (sample data) must be defined as the
coverage of deductive requirements specifications, that is, how much deductive requirements spec-
ifications were covered by the inductive requirements specification (sample data). If the structured
argument is in a tree structure, the ratio of leaf nodes that have corresponding sample data can be a
quality measure of sample data. A quality measure of inductive requirements specification is given
by the following:
• ”Number of GSN solutions (leaf nodes) having corresponding sample data” divided by
”Number of GSN solutions (leaf nodes) that could benefit from specifying sample data”
It is also important to handle the uncertainty of observation of machine learning systems in the
quality models for machine learning systems. The current quality measures are deterministic. In-
troducing a number of trials and variance to quality measures will incorporate the uncertainty of
observation and improve the expression power of quality models.
Another aspect in the lack of robustness is the extremely low probability of rare cases. It must be
noted that it is not possible to identify all rare cases by definition. We cannot evaluate the result
of rare case discovery; however, we can see the quality of the process or the effort involved in it.
Quality measures of the process of discovering rare cases would be the effort in rare case discovery
plus the number of rare cases discovered in a unit of time.
A viewpoint that is not included in the current quality models is development data, although
SQuARE has Data quality. Data quality in SQuARE is about the data included in the system it-
self, such as customer mailing address database. For machine learning systems, development data
— that is, test and training data — is rather important, and the quality models for machine learning
systems must include the corresponding quality. There are two different definitions for test data
quality and training data quality. The former is related to inductive requirements specification, that
is, an aforementioned quality of sample data. Test data quality includes the gap between manually
engineered deductive requirements specifications and actually collected sample data points. The
latter is related to design specification and includes the quality of manually annotated supervisory
signals. This will be a trade-off to the cost of labor-intensive annotation processes.
6 Conclusion
With the rapid development of technology in recent years, machine learning has begun to be em-
ployed in various systems. To use machine learning in a safety-critical system, such as an automated
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driving system, it is necessary to demonstrate the safety and security of the system to society through
the engineering process. In this paper, taking automated driving as an example, we presented open
engineering problems with corresponding related works and research directions from the viewpoints
of requirements, designs, and verifications for machine learning models and systems.
At the level of the machine learning model, we hypothesized an ideal training process that connects
deductive requirements and data-driven training, thereby considering test data as a requirements
specification and training data as a design specification. Moreover, we recognized that the char-
acteristics of machine learning models are a lack of requirements specification, a lack of design
specification, a lack of interpretability, and a lack of robustness. We also discussed the combination
of a conventional system and software quality standard, SQuARE, and the aforementioned charac-
teristics of machine learning models to study the quality models for machine learning systems. It
turned out that a lack of requirements specification (precondition specification and level of detail
for function specification) and a lack of robustness (uncertainty of observation and extremely low
probability rare cases) have the largest impact on the conventional system quality models. Further,
we discussed the direction of future quality models for machine learning systems; however, most of
it is a subject for future research.
Future research directions include the development of element technologies for engineeringmachine
learning models and systems, such as requirements specification techniques to cover test data dis-
tribution or open environments. As evident from this paper, there are numerous open engineering
problems and possible directions to address them. However, to establish an engineering process
for safety-critical machine learning systems, even if each company individually performs its own
engineering processes based on its own concepts, process activities and work products cannot be au-
tomatically accepted by human society. Individual practices are not standard, and in order to achieve
accountability, need evaluation on a case-by-case basis by a third party, particularly in case of prob-
lems. In such evaluations, own engineering practices of individual companies are at risk for being
misunderstood, otherwise proprietary development information has to be disclosed for accountabil-
ity. Thus, we need widely accepted standards to avoid these situations. Attempts to research element
technologies along with standard guidelines for requirements, designs, and verifications would also
be practically helpful. For example, a standard guideline for multiple verification tiers (actual data
testing for normal conditions, simulated data testing for the corner cases, automatic verification for
highest integrity levels only, falsification in middle integrity levels, etc.) would encourage the prac-
tical use of verification techniques and help an industry suffering from a lack of quality assurance
of machine learning systems. Another approach is to develop standard quality models for machine
learning systems. In this paper, we discussed the quality models for machine learning systems based
on SQuARE. Future research directions include discussing quality characteristics beyond SQuARE,
defining specific QM and QME, and quality characteristics and sub-characteristics if necessary.
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